Non-Delinquent Runaways
In addition to serving as an alternative to extradition for adjudicated and accused juvenile delinquents, the ICJ governs the return of non-delinquent runaways who cross state lines and are detained for more than 24 hours (excluding weekends and holidays). ICJ Rule 6-101 (Interstate Comm’n for Juveniles 2024). Once a runaway has been detained more than 24-hours or where abuse or neglect is suspected by holding authorities, application of the ICJ is mandatory. In Re Stacy B., 741 N.Y.S.2d 644, 646 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2002) (“The clear import of the language of the Compact is that the state signatories to the compact have agreed as a matter of policy to abide by the orders of member states . . . and to cooperate in the implementation of the return of runaway juveniles to such states.)
Runaways are defined as “persons within the juvenile jurisdictional age limit established by the home state, who (1) have voluntarily left their residence without permission of their legal guardian or custodial agency or (2) refuse to return to their residence as directed by their legal guardian or custodial agency but who may or may not have been adjudicated.” Id. at Rule 1-101.
The ICJ applies to runaways exclusively in the context of returning them to the state where the legal guardian or custodial agency resides. Thus, where the ICJ applies to juvenile delinquents and status offenders in both the transfer of supervision process and the return process, it applies to runaways only in the context of effectuating a return. In the context of runaways, the distinction between sending state and receiving state is replaced by the more appropriate designation of “home/demanding state” and “holding state,” the former being where the runaway’s legal guardian(s) or custodial agency is located and the latter being the state where the runaway is located. These terms are also applicable in cases involving absconders and accused delinquents.
A runaway is entitled to a hearing prior to being returned to the custodial state. However, the nature of the hearing need not rise to the level of a full due process hearing. As discussed, a juvenile has never been afforded the same spectrum of procedural rights as adults. See generally In re C.J.W., 377 So.2d 22, 24 (Fla. 1979). When a non-delinquent youth agrees to voluntarily return to their home state, the ICJ Form III, Consent for Voluntary Return, is used to document to the youth’s consent, as required by ICJ Rule 6-102. If the youth does not agree to return voluntarily, a non-voluntary return process must be initiated by the legal guardian or custodial agency in home/demanding state, in accordance with ICJ Rule 6-103. Upon the receipt of a requisition from a demanding state, the court in the holding state must hold a hearing for the purpose of determining whether the person(s) demanding return has legal custody to do so and the requisition complies with all procedural requirements. ICJ Rule 6-103(6) (Interstate Comm’n for Juveniles 2024).
While courts are naturally concerned about the best interest of the child, the holding state court’s determination in a requisition hearing should not be based on a best interest standard. Instead, if proof of entitlement is established, the requisition must be granted so that the youth can be returned to their home state, which can address concerns regarding the abuse, neglect, or other issues related to the best interest of the youth. To ensure that the best interest of the child is addressed in the home state, ICJ requires that the holding state’s ICJ office notify the home/demanding state of any allegations of abuse and neglect. Furthermore, “Allegations of abuse or neglect do not alleviate a state’s responsibility to return a juvenile within the timeframes in accordance with the rules.” Id. at Rule 6-105. Further discussion of the impact of suspected abuse, neglect, or human trafficking is provided in Section 4.2.1, supra.
Numerous published cases address the scope of requisition hearings. Most recently, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the “Interstate Compact for Juveniles did not authorize a holding state to conduct a best-interests analysis before ordering return of a runaway juvenile, even when there were reports of abuse or neglect.” Jessica J. v. State of Alaska, 442 P.3 771 at p. 774 (AK S. Ct. 2019). See also In re: C.P., 533 A.2d 1001, 1002 (PA 1987). See also In re C.P., 533 A.2d 1001, 1002 (Pa. 1987); see In re J.T. v. State, 954 P.2d 174, 176 (Okla. Civ. App. 1997) (“No law requires a finding by an Oklahoma court that it is in Appellant’s best interests to be returned to Kansas, nor has it been shown that the ICJ is constitutionally infirm for not requiring such a finding.”). Other courts have followed a similar rationale, finding that issues related to the “best interest” of the child are reserved to the requisitioning state. E.g., In re Teague, 371 S.E.2d 510, 512 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that when a judge finds the requisition in order, the juvenile shall be delivered to the demanding state). The Court in the case of In re Texas determined that the ICJ Form signed by the requisitioning state was dispositive of both ‘endangerment’ and ‘best interest’ of the juvenile in that the form states, “said juvenile’s continued absence from legal custody and control is detrimental to the best interest of said juvenile and the public.” 97 S.W.3d 744, 746 (Tex. App. 2003). By contrast, in interpreting Article IV of the Interstate Compact on Juveniles (the predecessor to the current ICJ), at least one state Supreme Court has held that courts in the holding state must afford a runaway the right to a hearing and a judge must “determine whether for the purposes of this compact the petitioner is entitled to the legal custody of the juvenile . . . and whether or not it is in the best interest of the juvenile to compel his return to the state.” State ex rel. White v. Todt, 475 S.E.2d 426, 434 n.8 (W. Va. 1996); see In Re M.D., 298 S.E.2d 243, 245 (W. Va. 1982) (court should determine whether return is in the best interest of the runaway); Application of Pierce, 601 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Mont. 1979) (it was not error by the trial court for refusing to return runaway to requisitioning state under the ICJ if court concluded that such return was not in the best interest of the child).
Though a runaway who refuses to voluntarily return is entitled to a hearing prior to being returned to the custodial state, the nature of the hearing need not rise to the level of a full due process hearing. As previously discussed, a juvenile has never been afforded the same spectrum of procedural rights as adults. See generally In re C.J.W., 377 So.2d 22, 24 (Fla. 1979).
One additional factor that must be considered is whether the juvenile is emancipated. When a juvenile who has not been adjudicated delinquent runs away without the consent of the legal guardian or custodial agency entitled to legal custody, such custodian may petition for the issuance of a requisition for the return of the juvenile, but must allege facts in the petition to show that the juvenile is not an emancipated minor. E.g., People v. Lucas, 992 P.2d 619, 623 (Colo. App. 1999). By contrast, a custodian and a home/demanding state would have no interest, jurisdictional basis, or nexus to petition for return of a non-delinquent juvenile who is emancipated. A fully emancipated juvenile would be entitled to exercise all rights of adulthood and, absent involvement in the juvenile or criminal justice system, would not need to account to a former custodian or state concerning his or her whereabouts or well-being. Id.