Chapter 3.2 Relationship Between Sending and Receiving States

Relationship Between Sending and Receiving States

The relationship created by a transfer of supervision between officials in a sending state and officials in a receiving state has been defined by courts as an agency relationship.  Courts recognize that in supervising out-of-state juveniles the receiving state is acting on behalf of and as an agent of the sending state.  See State v. Hill, 334 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Iowa 1983) (trial court committed error in admitting out-of-state offender to bail as status of the offender was not controlled by the domestic law of Iowa but rather by the Interstate Compact for Probation and Parole and the determinations of sending state authorities); State ex rel. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Coniglio, 610 N.E.2d 1196, 1198 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (“For purposes of determining appellee’s status in the present case, we believe that the Ohio authorities should be considered as agents of Pennsylvania, the sending state.  As such, the Ohio authorities are bound by the decision of Pennsylvania with respect to whether the apprehended probationer should be considered for release on bond and the courts of Ohio should recognize that fact.”). 

Thus, in supervising out-of-state juveniles, including issues arising with regard to detention and return, authorities in a receiving state are not acting exclusively as authorities of that state under the domestic law of that state but are also acting as agents of the sending state and to a certain degree are controlled by the lawful decisions of sending state officials.  Under the terms of the Compact, the receiving state “will assume the duties of visitation and supervision over probationers or parolees of any sending state.  Transfer of supervision under this statute is not a transfer of jurisdiction.  Although the day-to-day monitoring of probationers becomes the duty of the receiving state, the sending state does not abdicate its responsibility.” Keeney v. Caruthers, No. 10A05–0512–CV–699, 2007 WL 258425, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2007); Scott v. Commonwealth, 676 S.E.2d 343, 348 (Va. Ct. App. 2009); see Tex. Atty. Gen. Op., No. DM-147 (1992).

The terms and conditions imposed upon the juvenile, whose probation or parole is transferred under the Compact, are governed by the same standards that prevail for its own juveniles released on probation and parole.  See ICJ Rule 5-101 (Interstate Comm’n for Juveniles 2024); In re Crockett, 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 632, 639-40 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (considering the status of a Texas juvenile whose supervision was transferred to California under the compact where the Court held that: 

          The purpose of the ICJ, as stated in Welfare and Institutions Code section 1300, is to facilitate the cooperation of member states ‘to provide for the welfare and protection of juveniles and of the public with respect  to (1) cooperative supervision of delinquent juveniles on probation or parole.’ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1300, art. I.) Welfare and Institutions Code section 1300 specifically provides that ‘each receiving state will assume the duties of visitation and of supervision over any such delinquent juvenile and in the exercise of those duties will be governed by the same standards of visitation and supervision that prevail for its own delinquent juveniles released on probation or parole.’ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1300, art. VII, subd. (b).) Thus, the express terms of section 1300 prohibit California authorities from exercising ICJ supervision powers under standards that are different from those they apply to their own delinquent juveniles released on probation.  This prohibition bars authorities from requiring juveniles arriving on probation from other states to register as sex offenders based on orders from another state's court, if that requirement would not be imposed on a juvenile adjudicated by a California court under the same facts and circumstances.).

Even though it is clear under the ICJ and its rules that the receiving state’s standards apply to the terms of supervision, the Court emphasized that: “Nothing herein should be construed as preventing California law enforcement authorities or our courts from taking actions related to the supervision of petitioner’s probation pursuant to the ICJ or to the Texas State juvenile court adjudication and that court’s conditions of probation.” Id.


While supervision can be transferred pursuant to the ICJ, jurisdiction cannot be transferred.   Any proposed transfer of jurisdiction of an ICJ supervision case is in conflict with the Compact and ICJ Rules, as well as settled law in a number of compact member states.  The transfer of supervision of a juvenile under the Compact and ICJ rules, as presently conceived, like the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS), does not deprive the sending state of jurisdiction over the offender.  See, e.g., Scott v. Virginia, 676 S.E.2d 343, 347 (Va. App. 2009); State v. Lemoine, 831 P.2d 1345 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992).    For further discussion, see “Transfer of Jurisdiction Not Authorized Pursuant to the Interstate Compact for Juveniles” (Interstate Comm’n for Juveniles 2020).