ICJ Must Be Construed as Federal Law
The ICJ is not an advisory compact nor is the Commission a purely advisory body. Although the Commission has advisory responsibilities, the compact is more appropriately described as a regulatory compact creating a commission with broad rulemaking and enforcement powers. See Interstate Compact for Juveniles, art. XIII(b)(2) (2008); see In re Dependency of D.F.M., 236 P.3d 961, 966 n.41 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (“RCW13.24.011 art. IV “. . . the Interstate Commission for Juveniles has the power to ‘[a]dopt rules to effect the purposes and obligations of [the Interstate Compact for Juveniles] which shall have the force and effect of statutory law and shall be binding in the compacting states to the extent and in the manner provided in this compact.”). See generally Interstate Compact for Juveniles, art. VI-VII (2008). Consequently, the ICJ and its rules constitute a body of binding law. A member state may not impose procedural or substantive requirements on transfer cases unless such requirements comport with the ICJ and its rules.
Based upon the foregoing analysis in Section 1.4 supra, the ICJ is considered a “federalized” compact, thus it carries the weight of federal law. As determined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cuyler v. Adams infra., “Where Congress has authorized the States to enter into a cooperative agreement, and where the subject matter of that agreement is an appropriate subject for congressional legislation, the consent of Congress transforms the States’ agreement into federal law under the Compact Clause.” Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981). See also Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor v. Elizabeth-Newark Shipping, 164 F.3d 177,180 (3rd Cir. 1998)(“Although the Compact is a creature of state legislatures, it is federalized by virtue of congressional approval pursuant to the Compact Clause.”)
The current compact statute expressly invokes the Crime Control Act as having granted the advance consent of Congress “for cooperative effort and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime.” 42 U.S.C. § 675 (2004). On the one hand, the ICJ regulates in an area that traditionally has been within the authority of the states which is also the case with the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children for which the Consent of Congress was neither required nor sought by the compact member states. See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369-70 (1976); cf., McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 479 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[ICPC] focuses wholly on adoption and foster care of children—areas of jurisdiction historically retained by the states.” Congressional consent was not necessary for the compact’s [ICPC’s] legitimacy).
Nonetheless, Congress has clearly considered juvenile crime a national affair within the ambit of its legislative authority. See, e.g., Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5601 et seq. (2012). The intent of this legislation was to create nationwide standards for the handling of juvenile delinquency cases and to, wherever possible, address juvenile delinquency through the state courts not the federal courts. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2012); United States v. Juvenile Male, 864 F.2d 641, 644 (9th Cir. 1988); see, 18 U.S.C. § 5001 (2010); United States Attorney’s Manual § 9-8.00 et seq. Thus, if crime is considered in a broader context of an act and not the status of the perpetrator, the ICJ may be considered a crime control compact to which Congress has given advanced consent pursuant to 4 U.S.C. § 112. This is particularly so given that in 1934 when consent was granted, the federal government maintained no technical legal distinction between juvenile delinquents and adult criminals. United States Attorney Manual, Criminal Resource Manual § 116. It was not until the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1938 that Congress codified in federal law a different legal status for juvenile delinquents. Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1938, Pub.L. No. 75-666, 52 Stat. 764 (1938); see United States v. Allen, 574 F.2d 435, 437 (8th Cir. 1978).
Additionally, although the Extradition Clause of the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly empower Congress to legislate in this area, the Supreme Court has held that the federal extradition legislation is a valid exercise of congressional power. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 94 (1885) (recognizing that there was no express grant to Congress of legislative power to execute this provision, and that the provision was not, in its nature, self-executing, but declaring that a contemporary construction contained in the Act of 1793 and ever since continued in force had established the validity of Congress’s authority to legislate on the subject). Moreover, the constitutional provision and the legislation governing extradition make no special provisions for juveniles, and the cases, at least by implication if not expressly, recognize that juveniles may be extradited the same as adults. Even though special criminal proceedings may otherwise be required for juveniles, it has been held that such special proceedings are not required when extraditing juveniles. E.g., Ex parte Jetter, 495 S.W.2d 925, 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (There is “no limitation in the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act excluding minors from its operation.”); In re O.M., 565 A.2d 573, 582-83 (D.C. 1989).
Related cases reveal very little difference between the treatment of a juvenile in extradition proceedings and that of an adult where the process is being conducted under the general extradition statutes. Occasionally, a noteworthy difference has appeared in a case, but these cases have not developed any following. In re Boynton, 840 N.W.2d 762, 767 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013). Based on the foregoing, even though the ‘federalized’ nature of the ICJ has not yet been judicially affirmed, courts should construe the ICJ as federal law enforceable through the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Given the foregoing analysis on this issue and the fact that Congress has never taken issue with the ICJ’s statutory assertion of congressional consent under the Crime Control Act, as well as the trend towards trying many juvenile delinquents as adults (thus the nature of an act and its context leaves open the possibility that such offenses will be treated as a crime except as to very young offenders), state courts and state officials should apply the ICJ as federal law. The ICJ governs in an area within Congress’s legislative authority (interstate crime control) and implicates multistate regulation of cross border activity and has been held to be an alternative to extradition under the federal Constitution. Moreover, a state law that would conflict with or attempt to supersede the ICJ would be unenforceable as either (1) a breach of contract and/or (2) a violation of federal law.