Extradition of Juveniles and Status Offenders
At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, there was no meaningful distinction between juveniles and adults. Federal criminal law did not formally recognize the category of juvenile delinquents until the passage of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1938. Pub.L. No. 75-666, 52 Stat. 764 (1938); United States v. Allen, 574 F.2d 435, 437 (8th Cir. 1978) (“Indeed, prior to the enactment of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1938, juvenile offenders against the laws of the United States were subject to prosecution in the same manner as were adults.”). Therefore, constitutional provisions and federal legislation governing extradition made no special exception for juveniles. In re Boynton, 840 N.W.2d 762, 766 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (“The constitutional provision and the legislation governing extradition make no special provisions for juveniles, and the cases, at least by implication if not expressly, recognize that juveniles may be extradited the same as adults.”); see also Ex parte Jetter, 495 S.W.2d 925, 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); In re O.M., 565 A.2d 573, 583 (D.C. 1989); A Juvenile, 484 N.E.2d 995, 997 (Mass. 1985).
Article IV, §2 of the U.S. Constitution, commonly referred to as the Extradition Clause, provides the general framework for the interstate movement of individuals charged with criminal offenses, including juveniles, and subjects such individuals to extradition upon the demand of the executive authority of the state in which the crime was committed. Most states have adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (UCEA) or similar legislation to ensure that extraditions upon the demand of state executive authorities are consistent with Constitutional requirements.
The ICJ provides a Congressionally-authorized alternative to extradition as outlined in the U.S. Constitution, undoubtably a reason Congressional consent was necessary. See Carchman v. Nash, supra. This alternative is particularly important because many cases involving juveniles do not rise to the level of criminal offenses. As described in the ICJ Purpose Statement: “It is the purpose of this compact, through means of joint and cooperative action among the compacting states to: . . . (C) return juveniles who have run away, absconded or escaped from supervision or control or have been accused of an offense to the state requesting their return…” Interstate Compact for Juveniles, art. I (2008).
Through the ICJ Rules, the Interstate Commission has established procedural safeguards applicable to the return of juveniles to ensure protection of due process rights, including notice and opportunity to be heard. See Section 2.1.2 infra. However, procedural safeguards under the ICJ are somewhat relaxed because of the different objectives of the juvenile justice system. Relaxed procedural safeguards include: (1) not requiring formal demand by the executive authority of a state; (2) not requiring verification of charging documents or orders of commitment by governor or judge of a demanding state; (3) allowing detention, pending disposition of requisition with no right to bail; (4) no right to challenge the legality of the proceedings in the asylum state; (5) no right to independent probable cause determination; (6) no right to challenge identity; and (7) no protection of service of process in civil matters. In Interest of C.J.W., 377 So.2d 22, 23 (Fla. 1979). Pre-adjudicated juveniles who have been charged with an offense may be subject to return or extradition under either the ICJ or the Extradition Clause/UCEA. The use of formal extradition as envisioned in the Extradition Clause may be particularly appropriate when pre-adjudicated juveniles face charges that could subject them to trial as adults in the demanding state, e.g., meeting both age and serious offense criteria as defined by the law of the demanding state. In this case, the demanding state may request formal extradition of the juvenile through the standard process of demand and governor’s warrant.
To help distinguish extradition and return requirements, the Commission amended ICJ Rule 7-104, effective March 1, 2022, to specify that the ICJ applies to juveniles who are placed in custody pursuant to a warrant issued by a juvenile court. When the warrant is issued by an adult court in the home/demanding state, the UCEA or similar extradition law should be applied to extradite the juvenile, “unless the issuing authority in the home/demanding state determines that the juvenile should be returned pursuant to the ICJ.” See ICJ Rule 7-104 (Interstate Comm’n for Juveniles 2022). Thus, the ICJ and its procedures is one of two options in the pre-adjudication stage.
ICJ Rule 7-104 clarifies that the use of the ICJ is clearly controlling where the juvenile has not been charged with an offense that would subject them to trial as an adult in the demanding state, i.e., status offenders and non-delinquent runaways. The ICJ is also applicable and controlling in cases involving post-adjudicated juvenile delinquents who are either (1) under some form of supervision, or (2) already subject to the ICJ due to a transfer of supervision. The application of the ICJ is required, not optional, in cases involving post-adjudicated juvenile delinquents (unless they have committed a new offense in another state and that state is demanding formal extradition), as well as cases involving status offenses or runaways.