Analyzing Potential Conflicts between State Constitutions and ICJ
As with other compacts, the ICJ was drafted in a manner to generally avoid conflicts with state constitutions. Nonetheless, ICJ art. XII § A(2) provides, “All compacting states’ laws other than state Constitutions and other interstate compacts conflicting with this compact are superseded to the extent of the conflict.”
Questions have been raised as to the applicability of the above provisions to the issuance of bail/bond based on state constitutional rights, for juveniles detained pursuant to ICJ. Issuance of bail/bond in ICJ cases is generally prohibited by ICJ Rule 7-104, which states: “When a juvenile is in custody pursuant to a warrant issued by a juvenile court, the holding state shall not release the juvenile in custody on bond.” While this rule may appear to conflict with state constitutional provisions at first glance, closer analysis reveals that state constitutional provisions which otherwise would require bail/bond do not conflict because they are not applicable to juveniles detained pursuant to the ICJ.
As a fundamental matter, courts only have authority to adjudicate matters over which they have jurisdiction. Before they may act, courts must ensure their power to do so. See In re: 2016 Primary Election, 836 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2016). State courts generally do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate juvenile cases initiated in other states, except as authorized by the terms of the ICJ. This was a principal reason why Congressional consent was necessary for the ICJ. See In re O.M 565 A.2d 573 (D.C. 1989), in which the Court considered the underlying purposes of the predecessor compact to the current ICJ and determined that “the Compact was created and adopted by the states precisely because the Extradition Clause of the Constitution did not operate regarding supervision transfers with respect to juveniles.” supra. at 565 A.2d 573, 582-583.
Moreover, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution also requires the holding/receiving state to afford full faith and credit to the judgment or order of the demanding/sending state, where the juvenile was adjudicated or charged. This provision of the U.S. Constitution states:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State; And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. U.S. Const. art. IV, §1.
The U.S. Supreme Court has further interpreted the above language to mean that the Court's Full Faith and Credit Clause precedents, for example, demand that state-court judgments be accorded full effect in other States and “preclude States from adopt[ing] any policy of hostility to the public Acts of other States.” See Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, 139 S.Ct. 1485 at p. 1281, 587 U.S. ___ (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Hyatt, supra. the Court also clarified that “no State can apply its own law to interstate disputes over . . . interstate compacts.” See Hyatt, supra.; Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 278–279 (1959)